The Long War #9
KYIV—A lot has already been said about the impact of Vladimir Putin’s September 21 mobilisation announcement, with a strong focus on how it would hit a Russian society that, until now, the Kremlin kept carefully insulated from its “special military operations.” There’s already been dozens of reports about men being drafted all over Russia and far beyond Putin’s promised limited pool of “reservists and specialists”, and a general feeling that Russia is finally discovering the war.
But mobilisation, partial or not, might also have a huge impact in the Ukrainian regions that Moscow now looks set to annex. On Telegram, discussion channels in Russian-occupied cities have been awash with worry that the annexation could be followed up with the drafting of local men, as well as questions on the situation at the only frontline crossing point, between the Russian-held village of Vasilivka and the city of Zaporizhya. According to these frantic discussions, it is already impossible for men between 18 and 35 to leave the Russian-controlled territory. “Who knows what the hell is going on, some say that in Melitopol those with Russian passports have already been instructed to go to the military recruiting office” one message read.
The risk for Moscow is obvious: many of these men, who had until now remained in Russian-occupied territory and might have resigned themselves to the annexation of their land, will see the prospect of being sent to fight against the Ukrainian military as a red line, further degrading the situation in regions where morale is already low. They might refuse, rebel, hide, flee, or try to desert and surrender at the first opportunity.
Moscow could simply promise that Ukrainian locals won’t be drafted—a promise that looks pretty much impossible to make the second these territories become (in the eyes of Moscow) part of Russia. They *could* say that the mobilisation won’t apply to those who don’t have a Russian passport, which of course would be the best way to make sure nobody gets a Russian passport. The Kremlin backed itself into a corner.
There’s something else, too—in the south of Ukraine, the fear of mobilisation might come as just one additional destabilising factor. There already was the near-constant activity of partisans groups and infiltrated Ukrainian special forces, which have targetted Russian soldiers and officials as well as local collaborators with frightening regularity. More recently, there’s been the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv which, for locals who have been told for months that “Russia is here forever”, may have helped turn the idea of Ukraine coming back from a far-flung fantasy to a realistic prospect. It’s an effect that is of course much more psychological and a lot harder to quantify. But just a few days ago, a woman living in Mariupol that I talked to on the phone spontanously brought up the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a reason not to participare in the referendum, saying she did not want to be accused of collaborating if Ukraine ever came back. Mobilisation, partisan attacks and military successes, like a three-pronged attack slowly but surely undermining Moscow’s grip in these regions.
Something to read
(Foreign Policy just published a story I wrote on the work of Ukraine’s postal service in the frontline areas, you can check it out here)
(CIR) Parallel Worlds: How Russia is Imposing a New Reality on Kherson (an extremely timely look at how the Russian occupation is unfolding in the Kherson region, from policing to pension payments and electricity issues)