The Long War #40
Waiting in line at a mobilization center, getting exemptions in Mykolaiv and environnemental issues in wartime
KYIV—Hi everyone, let’s jump right in this week with four different stories on four different issues: what’s currently going at Ukraine’s mobilization centers (I really liked this particular slice-of-life piece of writing); which companies are getting exemptions from mobilization in the Mykolaiv region; whether the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is pro-Russian; and environmental issues in the Poltava region. With, as usual, a few additional stories recently published in Western legacy media.
Something to read
Zaxid (in Ukrainian) | “You’re 986th in line. Come back in three weeks” | May 24
The day-to-day life of a mobilization center in Lviv where, like everywhere else in the country, hundreds of men have been lining up every day for the past few weeks to update their personal data—a process the new law on mobilization has made compulsory.
In the line, the regulars discuss what a typical day looks like at the TCK [mobilization center]. In the morning comes a long line of people who made an appointment. They enter the main hall in groups, and are divided between districts and their corresponding offices [a TCK covers specific territorial districts; in Lviv, the TCKs for five separate districts are located in the same building]. They write their name on a piece of paper to join a new line, and they wait.
At some point around 9:15am, the doors open, and the first lucky 10—mostly those who got there before 6AM—can enter. After that, according to the men, another 10 are usually let in at around lunchtime. Everyone else will have to come the next morning, though some particularly stubborn men stay there even after dinner. The old-timers of the line tell of legends, cases when such groups managed to pass through the doors at unscheduled times.
In the afternoon, those who overcame the previous obstacles and can pick up their documents come to the TCK. There can be no more than 30 lucky men at that point, and it’s sometime just five.
[…]
There’s another line of about 10 people that is, surprisingly, constantly moving. Officers coming to meet with the leadership of the TCK, 18-years-old boys getting their first military registration document, these are let in quickly—only the “updaters” [those coming to update their personal data, the vast majority of people] are out of luck. In the afternoon, so are the men coming with summons.
“I have a draft notice but I couldn’t come earlier, I was being interrogated by a detective—here’s the proof” a small man with a large backpack says as he pushes the document under the window.
“The office is closed today, bosses said not to let anyone on the third floor after launch” comes the cheerful answer through the window. “I’m sorry, come back tomorrow”
In a voice full of anxiety, the small man asks that they at least put some sort of stamp on the summons to show that he came on time. Otherwise, he says, “I’ll get out of the TCK and they’ll arrest me right away”. The officer on duty scribbles something on the document.
NikCenter (in Ukrainian & Russian) | Fraudulent contractors received exemptions—Which businesses does the Mykolaiv region consider ‘critical’? | May 20
Mobilization is a big deal—a topic and process shaping the conversations, opinions and actions of millions of Ukrainians. So does “бронювання” (“reservation” as a literal translation, “exemption” as a more accurate one), the bureaucratic procedure allowing some companies deemed ‘critical’ to safeguard a share of their workers against mobilization. In a situation where most companies operate under the assumption that they can—and probably will—lose most of their male workers at some point, the benefit of being certain that a share of your workers won’t be mobilized in the foreseeable future (exemptions only last a couple of months and need to be renewed) is obvious.
In southern Ukraine, local investigative outlet NikCenter dived into the list of companies deemed critically important in the Mykolaiv region—71 companies, including 39 state and city companies, and 32 private businesses. The state companies are dominated by medical (10) as well as sport and cultural institutions (14). Construction, metallurgical and transport businesses make up two thirds of the private companies (22).
While this isn’t the focus of NikCenter’s investigation, the list does seem to point to regional disparity: three local drama theaters have for example been granted exemptions while, in Chernihiv, the local drama theater was a few days ago forced to shut down after 34 of its employees were summoned by the local recruiting center. NikCenter also point that some construction companies were granted exemptions despite winning some dubious contracts in the past.
Zois (in German) | Is there a Russian Church in Ukraine? | May 27
A valuable field report from Ukrainian researcher Andriy Fert, who studies the impact of the Russian invasion on the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This specific piece, based on discussions with clerics and faithful of the Church formerly known as the Moscow Patriarchate (the Church itself now rejects this label, while his critics tend just to call it the Russian church), wonders whether it should be considered pro-Russian.
The answer, according to Andriy Fert, is something along the lines of “a good part probably still is pro-Russian, yes”. An even more difficult question is what “pro-Russian” actually means—according to the people Andriy Fert quote in this story, some believe Ukraine is responsible for the war; others see Russia as a civilizational beacon; yet others “do not deny Russian aggression, but believe that there should be only one church [for Russians and Ukrainians]”. One final question raised by this piece is whether the Church has changed since the beginning of the invasion—Fert quotes a pro-Ukrainian priest of the Moscow Patriarchate claiming that “my church is changing, but gradually”. With the ban of the Church still being discussed in Ukraine’s parliament, it is a particularly pressing question.
Zmist (in Ukrainian) | Environmental problems of the Poltava Oblast in the third year of the Great War | May 28
Not long before I first settled in Ukraine as a correspondent, back in 2017, one topic had been rocking Ukraine’s political scene: trash. Garbage was piling up in the streets of Lviv, and city authorities were accusing Kyiv of preventing them from moving the trash to landfills outside of the region. The most commonly-held opinion at the time was that President Petro Poroshenko and his government were using the garbage issue to trash the reputation of Lviv mayor Andriy Sadoviy, who reportedly harbored presidential ambitions. Fun times.
This is a very convoluted way to introduce this piece from local outlet Zmist about environmental issues in the Poltava region. Landfills aren’t used as political weapons anymore, but they are very much still there: 523 of them just in this region between Kyiv and Kharkiv, more than 400 of which are illegal. Other issues include the transfer of protected land areas to private ownership (a similar move led to the recent fall of Ukraine’s agriculture minister) and the erosion of the shore near the Kremenchuk reservoir.
The issue tying them all together is money, whether is it available and whether it is appropriate to spend it in wartime. Over the years, the erosion of the shoreline next to the Kremenchuk reservoir has for example put in danger two villages, gnawed at a cemetery and damaged a road—yet plans to do some emergency work led to criticisms from some local officials who felt the money would be better spent on the military. It’s a dilemma that is unfolding every day across Ukraine, and that will only get more acute as Ukraine’s budgetary needs become more and more critical.
ICYMI
Stories from legacy Western media published this past day
Financial Times / US to offer Ukraine security pact as tensions rise between allies
The Washington Post / As Ukraine stumbles in war, Kyiv and Western powers struggle to coordinate
The New York Times / Ukraine Warns of Deepening Russian Threat in the North