The Long War #33
Surviving 2024, Telegram in frontline regions, hunting for Russian fertilizer, war and relationships
KYIV—Hello and welcome to this 33rd issue of ‘The Long War’—researched from Paris, written from Krakow, published from Kyiv.
Two English-language pieces that caught my eye last week were Christopher Miller’s “‘Active defence’: how Ukraine plans to survive 2024” (Financial Times) and David Lewis’ “The Quiet Transformation of Occupied Ukraine” (Foreign Affairs). The former takes stock of the military situation as of January 2024, echoing both concerns on tactical developments (such as Ukraine’s fragile bridgehead on the Dnieper’s left bank in the Kherson region) and the wider strategic picture, as Kyiv and its allies try to rebuild the country’s industrial base. It’s a sobering look that reflects a widely shared assessment in both Ukraine and the West that Kyiv may have to cede the initiative to Russia in the coming months.
David Lewis’ piece is all the more important considering that most information coming out of Ukraine’s occupied territories is disfigured by propaganda, making it extremely hard to know what exactly is going on over there—something powerfully illustrated by a recent investigation published by the Associated Press about Russia’s cover-up of deaths following the Kakhovka Dam explosion.
There’s no scoop in the Foreign Affairs piece, which rather takes the form of a chilling recap of the situation in these regions, from the filtration camps to the unavoidable propaganda in the schools. I also appreciate that the author didn’t shy away from difficult topics, including a Ukrainian collaboration law denounced by Ukrainian activists as too vague and broad, risking to trap people living under occupation who feel like any contact with the Russian administrative machine could get them prosecuted.
Turning back to Ukrainian media, Texty (a website dedicated to data-journalism on Ukraine) published a fascinating report about the use of Telegram—the main source of information for many Ukrainians—in frontline regions. Among many other insights, Texty found out that the most popular topics on these Telegram channels are all linked to shelling and combat actions, with reconstruction being limited to a few vague statements by authorities despite polls showing it to be a key area of interest for locals. Another point that speaks a lot to the wartime communication style: regional governors tend to prefer to publish official information on their own personal Telegram channel, rather than using the region’s official channel. Only problem is if that governor is fired (it has already happened), that channel “instantly turns into a personal blog”, Texty writes.
On a very different topic, investigative website Nashi Groshi worries in a recent piece that local administrations—from the Poltava police to the Chernihiv regional administration—are buying surveillance equipment of Chinese origin. The tender in the Chernihiv region specified the equipment would be used “to identify enemy sabotage and intelligence groups”—though the manufacturer, Hikvision, is part of 46 companies listed by Ukrainian authorities as “International Sponsors of War”. You’ve probably heard of Nashi Groshi, if only indirectly—his editor in chief Yuriy Nikolov has been recently been at the center of a major scandal when several unknown figures came to threaten him at his house.
The Russian invasion has transformed commerce in a myriad of ways. One of them has become common enough that agriculture-focused website Latifundist refers to it as a new “tradition”: Ukrainian customs officers blocking the import of fertilizer just ahead of the sowing season, as they search for “Russian traces”. According to Latifundist, it is common knowledge that Russian and Belarusian fertilizers packaged as coming from other, non-sanctioned countries, keep entering Ukraine. Kyiv thus started mandatory laboratory checks for all fertilizers entering the country, to the farmers’ great chagrin—who are also more than skeptical about the possibility of detecting Russian fertilizer with a lab test.
The last story I wanted to point out in this issue is an interview of Ukrainian soldier Artem Osypan done by Kyiv-based outlet The Village.
The conversation reminded me of a talk I had with a Ukrainian soldier just before leaving Ukraine for Christmas. We talked about the mood in the army, mobilization, being back in Kyiv for a short rest. He mentioned he had just refused a position at the Defense Ministry in Kyiv—a position that would have taken him out of the frontline, where he had almost continuously been for nearly two years. I asked how his wife felt about that: “I haven’t told her” he said.
Osypan talks a lot about that in this podcast—explaining and justifying his decision to tell his wife about his decision to join the military only at the very last minute, about war forcing the most surreal sort of long-distance relationship, about relationships with friends in the rear, about relationships at the front and how these relationships forged on heightened emotions and adrenaline may not survive the return to civilian life. It’s a painful and illuminating read, one that brings up a lot of topics that remain very much under-discussed despite becoming a shared experience for most Ukrainians.
ICYMI
Recently-published stories from Western media
The New York Times / As Missiles Strike, a Radio Station Broadcasts the Rage of a Battered City
Financial Times / Kyrylo Budanov: the Ukrainian military spy chief who ‘likes the darkness’
Bloomberg / Ukraine’s Financing Needs Will Be ‘Immense’ Says EIB’s Calvino
The Wall Street Journal / North Korea’s Missiles Are Being Tested on the Battlefields of Ukraine
War on the Rocks / Ukraine's War of Narratives