Hello everyone,
This week’s issue includes a story from The Guardian reporter Shaun Walker, who went to Odesa to witness the city ongoing’s derussification* effort. It comes just as, 400 kilometers up north, Ukrainian authorities started removing the Soviet coat of arms from the shield of the 102 meters-tall Motherland Monument in Kyiv. One thing that I find interesting about this latest development is that, while there is overwhelming agreement on the need to remove the Soviet hammer and sickle from the monument, there isn’t anybody currently asking to remove the statue itself—despite that statue being a quintessential piece of Soviet art and ideology.
The reason isn’t hard to fathom: cemented into the skyline, featured in thousands of iconic shots of Kyiv, the monument has become a symbol for the city, and one that most locals take pride in. The Russian invasion only gave it additional meaning, its raised sword and shield overlooking the Dniepr river becoming a perfect emblem of protection and defiance. It’s a fascinating example of how heritage and symbols can be reclaimed and remodeled.
*Here’s a fun fact: the Wikipedia page for “Derussification” is available in 11 languages. It was only created in April 2022 in the English language and in August 2022 in French, but has existed since December 2015 in Chinese and October 2009 in Russian. The Ukrainian-language version, meanwhile, appeared in November 2007—and was the first.
Something to read (in English)
The Guardian | Removing statues and renaming streets: Odesa cuts out Russia | July 28
In 2010, Kirill [head of the Russian Orthodox Church] visited Odesa to consecrate the newly reconstructed Cathedral. Myroslav Vdodovych, then a young priest in the branch of Ukrainian Orthodoxy that answered to the Moscow patriarchate, was present at the service.
Thirteen years later, Vdodovych, now the cathedral’s head priest, stood wide-eyed, surveying the wreckage of the building that was hit during a Russian missile strike last weekend. He mused on the horrors of Russia’s war on Ukraine, which has been enthusiastically supported by the man he used to consider his spiritual leader.
[…]
Even now, there is rather more tolerance [in Odesa] towards some Russian names than in many other Ukrainian cities. Many staunch Ukrainian patriots are in favour of leaving a few Russian street names, notably Pushkin Street, given that the Russian poet lived in Odesa for a year, and wrote many verses there.
“There were more than 200 streets named after Russian cities, writers and emperors, I don’t see a problem if we leave five of them, where there are real links to Odesa,” said Peter Obukhov, a local councillor.
Something to read (in Ukrainian)
BBC Ukraine | What’s wrong with the case of the SBU officers accused of helping Russia | July 24
Last year’s dismissal of Ivan Bakanov, a long-time acquaintance of Volodymyr Zelensky and until then the head of the powerful Security Service of Ukraine, was a big deal. Bakanov had been facing tough questions because of his unexplained absence from Kyiv in the first hours of the war but, as this excellent story from BBC Ukraine extensively details, his proximity to two high-ranking SBU officers accused of helping the Russian invasion is what led to his fall. Oleh Kulichin, former head of the SBU for Crimea, was detained a day before Bakanov’s dismissal. Andriy Naumov, the former head of the Main Department of Internal Security of the SBU, fled Ukraine on the eve of the Russian invasion and, according to media reports quoting investigators, gave Moscow documents that helped the Russian army seize the Chernobyl power plant (he’s been detained in Serbia since June).
It is a great look into the SBU’s kitchen and the latest attempt to purge the security service of Russian assets: Kulichin, it turns out, had been under investigation since 2021, an investigation that was at the time hidden from Bakanov because of the two men’s proximity. But the story’s key contribution is pointing out how messy and muddled in politics that attempt remains, as the cases against Kulichin and Naumov are making little progress because of a lack of evidence.
Sudoviy Reporter | ‘How a decent daughter went and broke the law’ | July 7
Another judicial story, focusing this time on one of the many trials of suspected collaborators that are now unfolding across Ukraine. This piece looks at the sentencing of a 30 years-old woman who worked for Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs during the occupation of Kherson. ‘Anna’ was sentenced to 5 years in jail, well below the 12 to 15 years in jail the law specifies for “holding a position in an illegal law enforcement agency in the occupied territory.” A leniency explained by the circumstances of the collaboration (her family was reportedly threatened) as well as the fact that the woman collected and later gave to the SBU information on more than 1,000 potential collaborators.
It’s a story that, to me, highlights how occupation affects the vulnerable first and foremost. In her testimony, ‘Anna’ claims she elected not to leave Kherson in the first days of the Russian invasion because her family did not have a car, her father was disabled and her mother suffered from heart disease—choosing to remain under occupation to take care of elderly or sick relatives is something I’ve heard about times and times again.
When ‘Anna’ nevertheless tried to leave a few weeks later, she was stopped at Russian checkpoints and later pressured into working for the occupation authorities. “I went to work because my parents were threatened, and I had no financial resources to live” she explained. These stories are often filled with unanswered questions, and this one is no exception, but it really showcases the complexity of dealing with collaboration cases.
Latifundist | Who’s going to work the fields? | July 25
From the Russian blockade of the Black Sea to the battles unfolding across the country’s heavily mined wheat fields, Ukrainian agriculture has suffered from the war more than maybe any other economic sector. In this piece, specialized outlet Latifundist points out yet one more issue farmers are now facing: chronic labor shortage, as so many people left Ukraine while more and more working men are being mobilized to fight.
This isn’t a minor issue—back in 2021, 15% of the country’s workforce was employed in the agriculture business (the figure is just 2% in the United States, or 3% in France). Today, the journalist writes, tractor drivers and other machine operators “are worth their weight in gold”. As tractors and other combine harvesters became complex machines filled with electronics, drivers and mechanics have turned into skilled specialists that are valuable to the military and hard to replace. But, according to the story, the main issue revolves around the legal process that allows companies to shield workers from mobilization. This “booking” process is described as unreliable and confusing, with workers often conscripted despite having previously been cleared to keep working in the fields.
ICYMI
Stories from legacy Western media published over the week-end (and today)
Wall Street Journal / Ukraine Removes Soviet Hammer and Sickle From Huge Kyiv Statue
The New York Times / Saudi Arabia Will Host Talks About Ukraine’s Peace Plan, Diplomats Say
Bloomberg / Banks Are Untold Story of Ukraine’s Survival, Even State Banks
New York Times / Amid the Counterattack’s Deadly Slog, a Glimmer of Success for Ukraine
NPR / A resident of Odesa, Ukraine describes life amid Russian missile and drone strikes
The Washington Post / In repeat bombing of Odessa, Putin deepens economic war on Ukraine
The New York Times / ‘We Can Never Forgive This’: In Odesa, Attacks Stoke Hatred of Russia
The Washington Post / A Ukrainian village's final farewell to soldier highlights toll of war