The Long War #38
KYIV—It has been a gloomy past few weeks here in Ukraine.
Back in September, I described in this newsletter how the mood had changed in the country. The understanding that the war would have no quick end had finally settled in, and uncertainty now permeated every discussion about the future.
But there’s now also a more immediate, much more short-term fear that things could go very wrong, very fast. This is, of course, in good part because of the situation on the frontline. It isn’t just the Russian advances, which have been significant compared to previous gains but still pretty limited when looking at the frontline as a whole. It is the fear that Ukrainian lines, defended by exhausted, undermanned and underequipped brigades who retreated behind hastily-raised fortifications could soon start cracking.
I wrote for the Financial Times about the Donbas town of Chasiv Yar and why the stronghold matters for the general defense of the region, and the consensus was that losing Chasiv Yar would allow Russia to try and cut off vital supply lines, threaten encirclement of Ukrainian troops positioned near Torestsk, and start preparing an offensive towards Kramatorsk.
There’s at least the hope that U.S military support will in the coming weeks help stabilize the frontline—but it isn’t just about the frontline. The Russian strikes on Ukraine’s power plants have put in dire straits an energy system that was already struggling following the campaign of the winter 2022-23. There’s also the looming date of May 20, which would have in peacetime marked the end of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s mandate. Officials and analysts in Kyiv fully expect Moscow to use this opportunity to paint the Ukrainian president as illegitimate. The brief but extremely intense debate over Kyiv’s decision to suspend consular services for fighting-age men abroad has exposed deep social divisions that could quickly turn political.
And there is mobilization, the understanding that Ukraine’s army doesn’t have enough men, that those who haven’t been drafted are more reluctant than ever to join, and that the government may have been waiting too long to tackle the issue one way or another. All of this is coming together into what looks like a perfect storm, with the question of where the frontline will be when US-financed weapons and ammo will finally reach the frontline.
Something to read
Slidtsvo Info (in Ukrainian) | “What right do they have to take all the men?” A day with conscription officers in Kyiv | April 29
Journalists from the Slidtsvo investigative outlet tagged along for a day with the officers given the unenviable task of telling men to report to the recruiting center—and potentially face mobilization. It’s happening in one of the nicer districts of Kyiv, and one should not assume that things all unfold as politely as it does in this story, or even the same way at all: in most smaller settlements, the dreaded convocations to report to the military commissariat are delivered by local officials (including sometimes the head of the village themselves) rather than by the military. Still, there’s a lot in this piece that showcases what the uneasy process looks like: the closed doors, the suspicious and vague answers by relatives trying to protect their sons, husbands or brothers, the Telegram channels reporting in real-time on the presence of officers, the abuse faced by the recruiters, some which are injured veterans.
Center for Civil Liberties (in Ukrainian) | Second national shelter monitoring campaign | April 30
Volunteers from the Ukrainian NGO “Center for Civil Liberties” (of Nobel Peace Prize fame) inspected 468 air raid shelters across 7 cities to assess how easily accessible and how properly maintained those places are. The results aren’t that great: in Mykolaiv, a city 75 kilometers from the frontline that is regularly shelled, the NGO attempted to inspect 30 shelters (from a total of 222 bomb shelters and 110 standard shelters), was only able to find 70% of those (most cities now have maps indicating the location of those shelters) and was only able to enter 7% of those—the worst result of the 7 inspected cities.
Bomb shelters are one of those wartime objects that have directly and indirectly entered into the daily life and unconsciousness of the country. Most Ukrainians rarely, if ever, set foot in them these days. But you still have signs pointing to the direction of nearby shelters in the street; you’ll still take a look at the building’s basement when renting a new flat; children at school still need to go down to the school shelter during every air raid alarm (while their parents are in most cities more likely to ignore it).
PONARS Eurasia | Ukraine’s Economy Moves Westward: Implications for Rebound and Reconstruction | April 9
A lot of fascinating data on the relocation of a significant chunk of Ukraine’s economy to the country’s Western regions. That westward shift can be felt beyond the economic sector, with (for example) reports emerging that real estate prices in Lviv are now the highest in all of Ukraine, despite Kyiv having been the most expensive city in Ukraine since pretty much forever.
ICYMI
Stories from legacy Western media published over the week-end (and today)
The New York Times / DNA Tests and Stranded Bodies: Ukraine’s Struggle to Name Its Dead
Bloomberg / Russia’s War Economy Starves Crucial Oil Industry of Manpower
BBC / 'If we go home, a lot of inexperienced soldiers will die'
The Guardian / ‘I love my country, but I can’t kill’: Ukrainian men evading conscription
Reuters / Ukrainians in embattled east mark third Easter under fire
The Washington Post / Ukrainian men abroad voice anger over pressure to return home to fight